This paper proposes a new scheme for authenticated encryption (AE) which is typically realized as a blockcipher mode of operation. The proposed scheme has attractive features for fast and compact operation. When it is realized with a blockcipher, it requires one blockcipher call to process one input block (i.e. rate-1), and uses the encryption function of the blockcipher for both encryption and decryption. Moreover, the scheme enables one-pass, parallel operation under two-block partition. The proposed scheme thus attains similar characteristics as the seminal OCB mode, without using the inverse blockcipher. The key idea of our proposal is a novel usage of two-round Feistel permutation, where the round functions are derived from the theory of tweakable blockcipher. We also provide basic software results, and describe some ideas on using a non-invertible primitive, such as a keyed hash function. A preliminary version appears at Eurocrypt 2014. This is the full version (version 20160329). This paper also contains an addendum in Appendix C that defines a variant of the scheme presented in the proceeding of Eurocrypt 2014. It is called "OTR with serial ADP", in a submission to CAESAR competition [38] . Bost and Sanders [21] reported a flaw in the proof of original specification with respect to masking constants. Reflecting [21] , this paper presents the updated specification. Software implementation results (Section 6) are not updated but still useful as the update has negligible impact on efficiency. † GF(2 n ) multiplication ‡ Security degrades as c approaches 1 ¶ two-block partition Benefits of inverse-freeness. The use of blockcipher inversion, as in OCB, has mainly two drawbacks, as discussed by Iwata and Yasuda [30] . The first is efficiency. The integration of encryption and decryption functions increases size, e.g. footprint of hardware, or memory of software (See Section 6). Moreover, some ciphers have unequal speed for enc/dec. For AES, decryption is slower than encryption on some, typically constrained, platforms. For example, an AES implementation on Atmel AVR by Osvik et al.
Introduction
Authenticated encryption. Authenticated encryption, AE for short, is a method to simultaneously provide message confidentiality and integrity (authentication) using a symmetric-key cryptographic function. Although a secure AE function can be basically obtained by an adequate composition of secure encryption and message authentication [14, 32] , this requires at least two independent keys, and the composition methods in practice (say, AES + HMAC in TLS) frequently deviate from what proved to be secure [42] . Considering this situation, there have been numerous efforts devoted to efficient, one-key constructions. Among many approaches to AE, blockcipher mode of operation is one of the most popular ones. We have CCM [3] , GCM [5] , EAX [16] , OCB [33, 44, 47] and the predecessors [26, 31] , and CCFB [36] , to name a few. We have some standards, such as NIST SP 800-38C (CCM) and 38D (GCM), and ISO/IEC 19772 [6] .
This paper presents a new AE mode using a blockcipher, or more generally, a pseudorandom function (PRF). Our proposal has a number of desirable features for fast and compact operations. Specifically, when the underlying n-bit blockcipher is E K (where K denotes the key), the properties of our proposal can be summarized as follows.
-The key is one blockcipher key, K.
-Encryption and decryption can be done by the encryption function of E K .
-For s-bit input, the number of E K calls is ⌈s/n⌉ + 2, i.e., rate-1 processing, for both encryption and decryption. -On-line, one-pass, and parallel encryption and decryption, under two-block partition.
-Provable security up to about 2 n/2 input blocks, based on the assumption that E K is a pseudorandom function (PRF) or a pseudorandom permutation (PRP).
These features are realized with a novel usage of two-round Feistel permutation, where internal round functions are PRFs with input masking. From this we call our proposal OTR, for Offset Two-round. Table  1 provides a summary of properties of popular AE modes and ours, which shows that OTR attains similar characteristics as the seminal OCB mode, without using the inverse blockcipher. The proposed scheme generates input masks to E K using GF(2 n ) constant multiplications. This technique is called GF doubling [44] , which is a quite popular tool for mode design. However, our core idea is rather generic and thus allows other masking methods. We also remark that Liting et al.'s iFeed mode [51] has similar properties to ours, without introducing 2-block partition. However, its decryption is inherently serial. In return for these attractive features, one potential drawback of OTR is that it inherently needs two-block partition (though the message itself can be of any length in bits), which implies more state memories required than that of OCB. The parallelizability of our scheme is up to the half of the message blocks, while OCB has full parallelizability, up to the number of message blocks. On-line processing capability is restrictive as it needs buffering of consecutive two input blocks . We also warn that the security is proved for the standard nonce-respecting adversary [45] , i.e. the encryption never processes duplicate nonces (or initial vectors), see Section 2. 2 . Some recent proposals have a provable security under nonce-reusing adversary, or even security without nonce (called on-line encryption) [9, 25] . However we do not claim any security guarantee for such adversaries. Table 1 . A comparison of AE modes. Calls denotes the number of calls for m-block message and a-block header and one-block nonce, without constants.
Mode
Calls On-line Parallel Primitive CCM [3] a + 2m no no E GCM [5] m [E] and a + m [Mul] yes yes E, Mul † EAX [16] a + 2m yes no E OCB [33, 44, 47] a + m yes yes E, E −1 CCFB [36] a + cm for some 1 < c ‡ yes no E OTR a + m yes ¶ yes ¶ E 2 Preliminaries
Basic Notations
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , }, and let {0, 1} * be the set of all finite-length binary strings, including the empty string ε.
The bit length of a binary string X is denoted by |X|, and let |X| a def = max{⌈|X|/a⌉, 1}. Here, if X = ε we have |X| a = 1 for any a ≥ 1 and |X| = 0. A concatenation of X, Y ∈ {0, 1} * is written as X∥Y or simply XY . A sequence of a zeros is denoted by 0 a . For k ≥ 1, we denote ∪ k i=1 {0, 1} i by {0, 1} ≤k . For X ∈ {0, 1} * , let (X [1] , . . . , X[x] ) n ← X denote the n-bit block partitioning of X, i.e., X [1] ∥X [2] ∥ . . . ∥X[x] = X where x = |X| n , and |X[i]| = n for i < x and |X[x]| ≤ n. If X = ε the parsing with any n ≥ 1 makes x = 1, X [1] = ε. The sequence of first c bits of X ∈ {0, 1} * is denoted by msb c (X). We have msb 0 (X) = ε for any X.
For a finite set X , if X is uniformly chosen from X we write X $ ← X . We assume X ⊕ Y is ε if X or Y is ε. For a binary string X with 0 ≤ |X| ≤ n, X denotes the padding written as X∥1∥0 n−|X|−1 . When |X| = n, X denotes X.
For keyed function F : K × X → Y with key K ∈ K, we may simply write F K : X → Y if key space is obvious, or even write as F if being keyed with K is obvious. If E K : X → X is a keyed permutation, or a blockcipher, E K is a permutation over X for every K ∈ K. Its inverse is denoted by E −1 K . A keyed function may have an additional parameter called tweak, in the sense of Liskov, Rivest and Wagner [34] . It is called a tweakable keyed function and written as F : K × T × X → Y or F K : T × X → Y, where T denotes the space of tweaks. Instead of writing F K (T, X), we may write as F The above definition can be naturally extended to the case when G K ′ is a URF, R $ ← Func(n, m). We have We stress that A in the above is allowed to choose tweaks, arbitrarily and adaptively. By convention we say F K is a pseudorandom function (PRF) if Adv prf FK (A) is small (though the formal definition requires F K to be a function family). Similarly we say F K is a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) if Adv prp FK (A) = Adv cpa FK ,P (A) is small and F K is invertible. A VIL-PRF is defined in a similar way.
Definition of Authenticated Encryption
Following [16, 45] , we define nonce-based AE, or more formally, AE with associated data, called AEAD. We then introduce two security notions, privacy and authenticity, to model AE security. Definition. Let AE[τ ] be an AE having τ -bit tag, where the encryption and decryption algorithms are AE-E τ and AE-D τ . They are keyed functions. Besides the key, the input to AE-E τ consists of a nonce N ∈ N ae , an associated data (AD, or a header) A ∈ A ae , and a plaintext M ∈ M ae . The output consists of C ∈ M ae and T ∈ {0, 1} τ , where |C| = |M |. The tuple (N, A, C, T ) will be sent to the receiver. The decryption function is denoted by AE-D τ . It takes (N, A, C, T ) ∈ N ae ×A ae ×M ae ×{0, 1} τ , and outputs a plaintext M with |M | = |C| if input is determined as valid, or error symbol ⊥ if determined as invalid.
Security. A PRIV-adversary
We assume A is nonce-respecting, i.e., all N i s are distinct. We also define random-bit oracle, $, which takes (N,
The privacy notion for A is defined as
An AUTH-adversary A against AE[τ ] accesses AE-E τ and AE-D τ , using q encryption queries and q v decryption queries. Let (N 1 ,
be all the encryption and decryption queries made by A. We define A's parameter list to be (q,
The authenticity notion for the AUTH-adversary A is defined as
where A forges if AE-D τ returns a bit string (other than ⊥) for a decryption query (
We assume AUTH-adversary A is always nonce-respecting with respect to encryption queries; using the same N for encryption and decryption queries is allowed, and the same N can be repeated within decryption queries, i.e. N i is different from N j for any j ̸ = i but N ′ i may be equal to N j or N ′ i ′ for some j and i ′ ̸ = i. Moreover, when F K and G K ′ are compatible with AE-E τ , let Adv cpa-nr F,G (A) be the same function as Adv cpa F,G (A) but A is restricted to be nonce-respecting. Note that Adv priv AE[τ ] (A) = Adv cpa-nr AE-Eτ ,$ (A) holds for any nonce-respecting A. In addition when F K and G K ′ are the pairs of encryption and decryption functions written as F K = (F e K , F d K ) and G K ′ = (G e K ′ , G d K ′ ) and they are compatible with (AE-E τ , AE-D τ ), we define Fig. 2 , OTR consists of two-round Feistel permutations using a blockcipher taking a distinct input mask in each round. To authenticate the plaintext a check sum is computed for the right part of two-round Feistel (namely the even plaintext blocks), and the tag is derived from encrypting the check sum with an input mask. The overall structure has a similarity to OCB, and the function AF E is a variant of PMAC [44] . We also show Fig. 6 as an alternative representation of Fig. 1 to make explicit the used constants over GF(2 n ) for masking.
Security Bounds
We provide the security bounds of OTR. Here we assume the underlying blockcipher is an n-bit URP, P.
The bounds when the underlying blockcipher is a PRP are easily derived from our bounds, using a standard technique, thus omitted.
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
Overview. The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 consist of two steps, where in the first step we interpret OTR as a mode of TBC and in the second step we prove the indistinguishability between the tweakable URF and the TBC used in OTR. This structure is essentially the same as original OCB proofs, say by Rogaway [44] , as well as many other schemes based on TBC.
First step: TBC-based design. In the first step, we define an AEAD scheme denoted by OTR[τ ], which we may abbreviate OTR if τ is obvious. It is compatible with OTR[E, τ ] and uses a tweakable n-bit URF,
The encryption and decryption functions of OTR[τ ] are OTR-E τ and OTR-D τ , and they consist of encryption core EF R , decryption core DF R , and authentication core AF R , as shown by Fig. 4 . For reference OTR is also illustrated in Fig. 5 . They can be seen as counterparts of EF E , DF E , and AF E of OTR[E, τ ]. Fig. 4 also defines OTR ′ [τ ], which uses an independent VIL-URF, R ∞ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n , instead of AF R . We first derive the security bounds of OTR ′ [τ ] in the following theorem. The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix A. Moreover, for any AUTH-adversary A using q encryption queries and q v decryption queries, 22 . return (C, TE) 10 . return TA Fig. 1 . Algorithms of OTR. Tag bit size is 0 < τ ≤ n, and X denotes the 10 * padding of X, see Section 2.1. Proof intuition of Theorem 3. To understand Theorem 3, there are two important properties of a tworound Feistel permutation, denoted by ϕ f1,f2 : [1] and f 1 and f 2 are independent n-bit URFs. Then we have the followings.
), is uniform unless the event Bad 1 : X[1] = X ′ [1] occurs, which has the probability at most 1/2 n . Property 1 is simple because f 1 and f 2 are independent and the output of ϕ consists of those of f 1 and f 2 . Property 2 needs some cares. It holds because if X [1] 
) is distributed uniformly random, independent of all other variables, and this makes X ′ [2] = f 1 (X ′ [1] ) ⊕ Y ′ [1] completely random. The Bad 1 event has probability 1/2 n when Y ′ [1] ̸ = Y ′ [1] , and otherwise 0. Note that (X [1] , X [2] , Y [1] , Y [2] ) reveals corresponding I/O pairs of f 1 and f 2 , however this does not help gain the probability of Bad 1 .
Intuitively, the privacy bound of Theorem 3 is simply obtained by the fact that all TBC calls in the game has distinct tweaks and all output blocks contain at least one TBC output with unique tweak. Combined with Property 1, this makes all output blocks perfectly random, hence the privacy bound is 0. For the authenticity bound, suppose adversary A performs an encryption query (N, A, M ) and obtains (C, T ), and then performs a decryption query (N ′ , A ′ , C ′ , T ′ ) for some C ̸ = C ′ with |C| = |C ′ |, with (N ′ , A ′ ) = (N, A). This implies that there exists at least one chunk (2n-bit block) of C ′ different from the corresponding chunk in C, and from Property 2, the right half of the corresponding decrypted plaintext chunk is completely random, unless Bad 1 occurs. There is another chance for the adversary to win, i.e. the checksum collision Bad 2 : Σ ′ = Σ, which has probability 1/2 n provided Bad 1 did not happen. Hence we have Pr[Bad 1 ∪ Bad 2 ] ≤ Pr[Bad 1 ] + Pr[Bad 2 |Bad 1 ] ≤ 2/2 n . When both events did not happen (i.e. given Bad 1 ∪ Bad 2 ), the final chance is to successfully guess the tag, where the probability is clearly bounded by 1/2 τ because different checksums yield independent tags. Hence the authenticity bound is 2/2 n + 1/2 τ for any A using q v = 1 decryption query (of course we need to consider the existence of other encryption queries and many other cases for (N ′ , A ′ , C ′ , T ′ ) as well, however the above bound holds for all cases). Finally we use a well-known result of Bellare, Goldreich and Mityagin [13] to obtain 2q v /2 n + q v /2 τ for any q v ≥ 1.
switch ω 4.
Case f :
Case a2 : Second step: analysis of TBC. In Fig. 3 we define a TBC, G[P] ⟨N,i,ω⟩ (X), where (N, i, ω) is a tweak. It uses an n-bit URP, P. We remark that G [P] slightly abuse N as it allows N = 0 n , making N to be an element of N ′ ae . For tweaks that do not appear in Fig. 3 , we let them as undefined. We observe that G [P] is compatible with R, the tweakable URF used by (components of) OTR[τ ] and OTR ′ [τ ], and in addition G [P] is implicitly used by OTR [P, τ ] , where the usage is the same as the way OTR[τ ] uses R. More formally, we have the following proposition.
Note that G [P] does not perform GF doublings in a sequential manner, instead a full multiplications for every input. This is inefficient in practice, however does not cause a problem for simulation purpose. We then prove that G [P] is a secure tweakable URF, shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any adversary A accessing G[P]
withueries, we have Adv cpa
We also provide the indistinguishability bound between AF R and R ∞ , which is as follows.
Lemma 2. For any A with σ input blocks, we have Adv prf
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix B. The proof of Lemma 2 is the same as a part of PMAC proof, more specifically the last equation of Appendix E of [46] .
Third step: deriving bounds.
For privacy notion, there exist adversaries B against AF R with σ A input blocks, and C against G [P] with σ priv queries, satisfying
where the third inequality follows from Proposition 1, Lemma 2, and Theorem 3, and the fourth inequality follows from Lemma 1. Similarly, for authenticity notion, there exist B against AF R with σ A + σ A ′ input blocks, and C against G [P] with σ auth queries, satisfying
where the fourth inequality follows from Proposition 1, Lemma 2, and Theorem 3, and the fifth inequality follows from Lemma 1. This concludes the proof.
Experimental Results on Software
We implemented OTR on software. The purpose of this implementation is not to provide a fast code, but to see the effect of inverse-freeness in an experimental environment. We wrote a reference-like AES C code that takes byte arrays and uses 4Kbyte tables for combined S-box and Mixcolumn lookup, so-called T-tables. AES decryption of our code is slightly slower than encryption (see Table 2 ). We then wrote pure C code of OTR using the above AES code. All components, e.g. XOR of blocks and GF doubling, are byte-wise codes. For comparison we also wrote a C code of OCB2 [44] in the same manner, which is similar to a reference code by Krovetz [2] . We ran both codes on an x86 PC (Core i7 3770, Ivy bridge, 3.4GHz ) with 64-bit Windows 7. We used Visual C++ 2012 (VC12) to obtain 32-bit and 64-bit executables and used GCC 4.7.1 for 32-bit executables, with option -O2. We measured speed for 4Kbyte messages and one-block header. We also tested the same code on an ARM board (Cortex-A8 1GHz) using GCC 4.7.3 with -O2 option. Their speed figures in cycles per byte 1 are shown in the upper part of Table 2 . For both OTR and OCB2, we can observe a noticeable slowdown from raw AES, however, OTR still receives the benefit of faster AES encryption. Another metric is the size, which is shown in the lower part of Table 2 . For OTR we can remove the inverse T-tables and inverse S-box from AES code, as they are not needed for AES encryption, resulting in smaller AES objects.
We also measured the performance of these codes when AES is implemented using AESNI (on the Core i7 machine, using VC12). We simply substituted T-table AES with single-block AES routine using AESNI. In addition, two common functions to OCB2 and OTR, namely XOR of two 16-byte blocks and GF doubling, are substituted with SIMD intrinsic codes. Other byte-wise functions are unchanged. On our machine single-block AES ran at around 4.5 to 5.5 cycles per byte, for both encryption and decryption. Table 3 shows the results. It looks interesting, in that, although we did not write a parallel AESNI routine, we could observe the obvious effect of AESNI parallelism via compiler. Notably, both OTR and OCB2 achieved about 2 cycles per byte for 4K data, and OCB2 is slightly faster as expected. We think further optimization of OTR would be possible by using parallel AES routine with full utilization of SIMD instructions and a careful register handling in a similar manner to OCB, e.g. see a recent report by Bogdanov et al. [20] . These experiments, though quite naive, imply OTR's good performance under multiple platforms with a simple code. Of course, optimized implementations for various platforms are interesting future topics. 
Remarks

Remove Inverse from OCB
The abstract structure of OTR has a similarity to OCB, however, removing inverse is not a trivial task. Roughly, in OCB, each plaintext block is given to the ECB mode of an n-bit TBC E K [34] , namely
where tweak T consists of nonce N and other parameters, based on a blockcipher E K . The OCB decryption uses the inversion of TBC, E −1 K , and the security proof requires that
K needs a computation of E −1 K , a natural way to remove E −1 K from OCB is to compose E K from a PRP or a PRF. For example we can do this by using a 2n-bit 4-round Feistel cipher as E K , based on an n-bit PRF, F K . Then, the resulting mode (of F K ) is inverse-free and provably secure, since 4-round Feistel cipher is an SPRP, as shown by Luby and Rackoff [35] (it is easy to turn a SPRP into a tweakable SPRP). However, we then need four F K calls per two blocks, i.e. the rate is degraded to two. Considering this, the two-round Feistel is seemingly a bad choice, since it even fails to provide a (tweakable) PRP. As explained in Section 5, the crucial observation is that, the encryption of two-round Feistel in OTR is invoked only once for each tweak, and that the authenticity needs only an n-bit unpredictable value in the decryption, rather than 2n bits. Two-round Feistel fulfills these requirements, which makes OTR provably secure.
Design Rationale for Masking
We remark that using the same mask for the two round functions, i.e. using 2 i L for the first and second rounds of a two-round Feistel, does not work. This is because Property 2 of Section 5 does not hold anymore since the two-round Feistel becomes an involution. Once you query (X [1] , X [2] ) and receive ( [2] ). This implies that the adversary can control the checksum value in the decryption, hence breaks authenticity.
We also remark that the masks for EF E depend on N , hence do not allow precomputation. In contrast the latest OCB3 allows mask precomputation by using E K (0 n ) [33] . The reason is that we want our scheme not to generate E K (0 n ) for header-less usage (i.e. when A is always empty). As a result our scheme has a rather similar structure as OCB2 and an AEAD mode based on OCB2, called AEM [44] . Recent studies reported that the doubling is not too slow [10] , hence we employ on-the-fly doubling as a practical masking option.
Comparison with Other Inverse-free Modes
Section 6 only considers a comparison with OCB. Here we provide a basic comparison with other modes, in particular those not using the blockcipher inverse. Table 1 shows examples of such inverse-free modes. Among them, CCM, GCM, and EAX are rate-2, assuming the speed of field multiplication in GCM is comparable with blockcipher encryption. At least in theory, OTR is faster for sufficiently long messages for its rate-1 computation. For CCFB, the rate c is a variable satisfying 1 < c and c ≈ 1 is impractical for weak security guarantee 2 . For memory consumption, all inverse-free modes including OTR have a similar profile, as long as the blockcipher encryption is the dominant factor. An exception is GCM since field multiplication usually needs large memories. At the same time, a potential disadvantage of OTR is the complexity introduced by the two-round Feistel, such as a limited on-line/parallel capability, and a slight complex design compared with simple designs reusing existing modes like CTR, CFB, and CMAC.
Other Instantiations
As the core idea of our proposal is general, it allows various instantiations, by seeing OTR or OTR ′ as a prototype. What we need is just to instantiate R accepting n-bit input and tweak (N, i, ω), and producing n-bit output. While we employ GF doubling, one can use a different masking scheme, such as Gray code [33, 47] , or word-oriented LFSR [22, 33, 50] , or bit-rotation of a special prime length [39] . Moreover, we can use non-invertible cryptographic primitives, typically a Hash-based PRF such as HMAC, or a permutation of Keccak [17] with Even-Mansour conversion [24] for implementing a component of OTR. In the latter case the resulting scheme does not need an inversion of the permutation, which is different from the permutation-based OCB described at [40] , and there is no output loss like "capacity" bits of SpongeWrap [18] . In these settings, it is possible that the underlying primitive accepts longer input than output. Then a simple tweaking method by tweak prepending can be an option. For example we take SipHash [12] , which is a VIL-PRF with 64-bit output. A SipHash-based scheme would be obtained by replacing R ⟨N,i,ω⟩ (X) of OTR ′ (Fig. 4 ) with SipHash K (N ∥i∥ω∥X), and replacing R ∞ (X) with SipHash K (0 n ∥0∥h∥X), accompanied with an appropriate input encoding. As SipHash has an iterative structure, a caching of an internal value allows efficient computation of SipHash K (N ∥i∥ω∥X) from SipHash K (N ∥i ′ ∥ω ′ ∥X ′ ). We remark that this scheme has roughly 64-bit security. The proof is trivial from Theorem 3, combined with the assumption that SipHash is a VIL-PRF.
Conclusion
This paper has presented an authenticated encryption scheme using a PRF. This scheme enables rate-1, on-line, and parallel processing for both encryption and decryption. The core idea of our proposal is to use two-round Feistel permutation with input masking, combined with a message check sum. As a concrete instantiation we provide a blockcipher mode, called OTR, entirely based on a blockcipher encryption function, which may be seen as an "inverse-free" version of OCB. Our proposal has a higher complexity than OCB outside the blockcipher, hence it will not outperform OCB when the blockcipher enc/dec functions are natively supported and equally fast (say CPU with AESNI), despite the relaxed security assumption. Still, our proposal would be useful for various other environments where the use of blockcipher inverse imposes a non-negligible cost, or when the available crypto function is simply not invertible.
A Proof of Theorem 3
PRIV bound. We observe that the any output block of encryption oracle OTR ′ -E τ contains an output block of for some ω ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 } and thus random. Tag T is an XOR of TE and TA and the latter is R ∞ (A) if A ̸ = ε and 0 n if A = ε, therefore, T is also independent and random. This implies that the output blocks in (C, T ) is completely random and independent of the adversary's choice (except the length), thus indistinguishable from those of $ oracle. PRIV bound is naturally derived from this observation. AUTH bound. We first consider the case q v = 1. Let A be AUTH-adversary against OTR ′ with q encryption queries and a decryption query. Without loss of generality we can assume A first performs all encryption queries before the decryption query, which is the best strategy for maximizing the probability of successful forgery.
Following Section 2.2, we denote the i-th encryption query and the answer as
Let T * be the true tag value for the forgery attempt. Similarly we define TE * , TA * and Σ * for the corresponding values produced in the decryption of the forgery attempt, which uses (N ′ , A ′ , C ′ ). The forgery attempt is accepted as valid iff T * = T ′ , where
where lsb n (X) denotes the last (rightmost) n bits of X. Let m ′ = |C ′ | n and ℓ ′ = |C ′ | 2n . We consider parsings,
is called a finalization and the tweak (N ′ , ℓ ′ , ω ′ ) is called a finalization tweak.
Let . .,q be the transcript obtained by encryption queries. Seeing Z as a random variable, the forgery probability is written as
where the probability space is defined by the interactive game involving A and OTR ′ (also applies to all probabilities hereafter). In deriving the authenticity bound, we fix adversary A and define FP z as Pr[T ′ = T * |Z = z], and bound a maximum of FP z for all possible z with A. This provides the upper bound of Adv auth OTR ′ (A). Here we can assume that A produces a decryption query (N ′ , A ′ , C ′ , T ′ ) deterministically from z so that it maximizes FP z . Note that, the transcript reveals all the input-output pairs for R invoked at all encryption queries, except the residual bits of Z in the check sum for the case of even plaintext blocks (the security proof does not rely on this fact though). Hence (N ′ , A ′ , C ′ , T ′ ) can be any function of these input/output pairs of R. We perform a case analysis for (N ′ , A ′ , C ′ ).
The finalization tweak is new, hence the TE * is independent and uniformly random.
We have T * = msb τ (TE α ⊕ TA * ). First we observe that, throughout the attack the adversary obtains no knowledge about TA α for all non-empty A α , since TA α is xored with TE α , and TE 1 , . . . , TE q , including TE α , are independent and uniform. Note that for any i ≤ q with A i = ε we always have TA i = 0 n , and for A α ̸ = ε we have TA α = R ∞ (A α ), which is random. If we have A α = A β ̸ = ε the adversary only knows that TA α is uniformly random over {0, 1} n , thus completely unpredictable, and the equation TA β = TA α . This means that the adversary can not predict TA α for any non-empty A α beyond random guess. Using this observation we do a further case analysis with respect to A ′ .
Case 2-1:
We observe that TA * = R ∞ (A ′ ) is uniformly random, thus FP z ≤ 1/2 τ . Case 2-2: A ′ ̸ = A i for all i = 1, . . . , q, and A ′ = ε. We observe that TA * = 0 n and T * = msb τ (TE α ) = msb τ (TA α ⊕ T α ) for non-empty A α . Then TA α is completely unpredictable to the adversary. Thus T * is also completely unpredictable, and we have FP z ≤ 1/2 τ . Case 2-3:
We observe that TA * = TA β and T * = msb τ (TA β ⊕TE α ). As TA β for non-empty A β is completely unpredictable, we have FP z ≤ 1/2 τ . Case 2-4: A ′ = A β = ε for some β ̸ = α. We observe that TA * = TA β = 0 n and T * = msb τ (TE α ) = msb τ (T α ⊕ TA α ). As A α ̸ = ε holds TA α is completely unpredictable, and we have FP z ≤ 1/2 τ .
Therefore, for all cases we have FP z ≤ 1/2 τ . We then consider cases with N ′ = N α for some α and
Here we have m ′ = m α and ℓ ′ = ℓ α as |C ′ | = |C α | holds. Note that we made no assumption on A ′ . Case 3-1: |CC ′ [ℓ ′ ]| = 2n. We observe that the finalization tweaks for α-th query and the forgery attempt are the same, i.e. (N α , ℓ α , a 2 ). This means that, there exists at least one chunk different, i.e., we must have
We first consider the case i < ℓ α . Then we obtain
in the decryption process of the forgery attempt. Let e 1 denote the event 
where the third inequality is obtained by taking the maximum for all possible values of TA * . We then consider the case i = ℓ α , i.e. the difference is in the last chunks. For this case the same analysis holds when we exchange
The finalization tweak is (N α , ℓ α , a 1 ), for both α-th encryption query and the forgery attempt. We have
, which we denote by event e 1 , has probability 1/2 n . This 
in the same manner as Case 3-1.
The finalization tweak is (N α , ℓ α , b 2 ), for both α-th encryption query and the forgery attempt. We have (Σ * ) is random and independent of TE α , implying FP z ≤ 1/2 τ . Thus FP z is bounded by 1/2 τ + 2/2 n in Case 3-3.
Case 3-4: |CC ′ [ℓ ′ ]| < n. The finalization tweak is (N α , ℓ α , b 1 ), for both α-th encryption query and the forgery attempt. The analysis is similar to Case 3-3, and we have FP z ≤ 1/2 τ + 2/2 n . Case 4:
Case 4-1: |CC α [ℓ α ]| = 2n. The finalization tweak for the forgery attempt is (N α , ℓ ′ , ω) for ω ∈ {a 1 , a 1 , b 1 , b 2 }, and that for the α-th encryption query is (N α , ℓ α , a 2 ). Note that ℓ ′ may or may not equal to ℓ α . As we have (ℓ α , a 2 ) ̸ = (ℓ ′ , ω) (otherwise |C ′ | = |C α | holds) and are different due to the padding. Defining two bad events, e 1 and e 2 , in the same manner to Case 3-2, we have FP z ≤ 1/2 τ + 2/2 n . Case 4-3: |CC α [ℓ α ]| = n. The finalization tweak for the forgery attempt is (N α , ℓ ′ , ω) for ω ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 }, and that for the α-th encryption query is (N α , ℓ α , b 2 ). We have (ℓ α , b 2 ) ̸ = (ℓ ′ , ω), and thus FP z ≤ 1/2 τ holds as Case 4-1.
Case 4-4: |CC α [ℓ α ]| < n. The finalization tweak for the forgery attempt is (N α , ℓ ′ , ω) for ω ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 }, and that for the α-th encryption query is (N α , ℓ α , b 1 ). If (ℓ α , b 1 ) ̸ = (ℓ ′ , ω), we have FP z ≤ 1/2 τ as Case 4-1, and if (ℓ α , b 1 ) = (ℓ ′ , ω) and there exists CC ′ [i] ̸ = CC α [i] for some i < ℓ ′ , the analysis is the same as Case 3-1, and we have FP z ≤ 1/2 τ +2/2 n . 
B Proof of Lemma 1
For proving the security bound of G [P] , the crucial observation is that the input mask, denoted by ∆ in Fig. 3 , is differentially uniform for any two distinct inputs. From Fig. 3 this is easily confirmed that G [P] is identical to Rogaway's XE mode [44] for n = 128. More specifically, all the coefficients of P(N ) or P(0 n ) appeared in Fig. 3 are written as 2 i 3 j 7 k . [44] shows that 3 
In our case, (i, j, k) is always in I × J × K, assuming i, which represents the block index of plaintext/ciphertext/AD, is at most 2 n/2 = 2 64 . Then, Theorem 7 of [44] proves that Adv cpa
Finally, a generalized variant of PRP/PRF switching lemma (e.g., Lemma 1 of [15] ) tells that Adv cpa P, R (A) ≤ 0.5q 2 /2 n for q CPA queries, hence the proof is completed as Adv cpa 13 . if m is odd 14 .
C then 25 . return (C, TE) then 
C A Variant with Serial AD Processing
Motivation. While OTR of the main body (Section 3) enables parallel processing for both message and associated data (AD), we naturally want to simplify it when the underlying computing environment is serial. We find that PMAC-like AF E for AD processing (ADP) is not well suited to serial computing, causing GF doubling for each AD block. Moreover, when AD is processed first (which is normal), we need to keep TA until we compute TE, which requires additional memory state. With this in mind, this section defines a variant of OTR of the main body, which uses CMAC [28] for ADP. We call this variant as "OTR with serial ADP", while the original scheme in the main body may be called "OTR with parallel ADP", if needed, for a consistency with a submission document of OTR [38] to CAESAR competition [1] . In addition, for the notational purpose this section uses the name OTRS for an alias of "OTR with serial ADP", and uses the name OTR to denote the scheme of the main body.
The security bounds of OTRS and corresponding proofs are also given in this section. Although the security bounds are mostly the same as OTR, proving the security bounds of OTRS requires partially different steps due to the differences in authentication.
C.1 Specification
We write OTRS[E, τ ] to denote OTRS with blockcipher E, tag bit size τ (and this corresponds to OTR[E, τ, s] in [38] ). The encryption and decryption functions are denoted by OTRS-E E,τ and OTRS-D E,τ , and shown in Fig. 7 . Encryption of OTRS is also illustrated in Fig 8, and an alternative representation of Fig. 1 is shown by Fig. 6 .
The interfaces of OTRS-E E,τ and OTRS-D E,τ are the same as OTR-E E,τ and OTR-D E,τ of OTR. The algorithms of Fig. 7 are further decomposed into encryption core EF-S E , decryption core DF-S E , and authentication core AF-S E . For EF-S E and DF-S E the pseudocodes are the same as EF E and DF E of Fig. 4 except line 2 .
Here, TA is generated by AF-S E , a variant of OMAC [28] , also known as CMAC [4] .
C.2 Security Analysis
Extended security notion. PRIV and AUTH notions are slightly extended in that the adversary is allowed to perform encryption queries (N 1 ,
, (N q , A q , M q ) as long as (N i , A i ) ̸ = (N j , A j ) holds for any i ̸ = j. That is, the security is preserved as long as the uniqueness of (A, N ) pairs is guaranteed for encryptions, even if the uniqueness of original nonce, N , is not guaranteed. In a word we can deem (A, N ) as nonce. This comes from the structure of the scheme for combining the result of ADP and the encryption, and has a similarity to CLOC [29] . In conjunction with this extension we extend the definitions of PRIV-adversary, AUTH-adversary, and the supplemental notions Adv cpa-nr F,G (A) and Adv cca-nr F,G (A) so that the adversary is allowed to perform encryption queries as long as the uniqueness of pairs (A, N ) is guaranteed for encryptions. The parameters for adversaries, such as q and σ A , are similarly defined as in the main body. Bounds. We provide the security bounds of OTRS. For simplicity we assume the underlying blockcipher is an n-bit URP, P. The computational counterparts are fairly straightforward, thus omitted. 
L * ← L ♯ 15. if m is odd 16 . 22 . return (C, TE)
Algorithm DF-SE(N, C, TA) 22 . return (M, TE) Algorithm AF-SE(A) Fig. 7 . Algorithms of OTRS. Tag bit size is 0 < τ ≤ n, and X denotes the 10 * padding of X. Fig. 8 . Encryption of OTRS. Box with underline and X denote the 10 * padding of input X.
C.3 Proofs of Theorems 4 and 5
Overview. The proof structure is the same as those of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. In the first step, we reinterpret the scheme as a mode of tweakable blockcipher, and then prove the security of the tweakable blockcipher in the second step, and the third step combines the results of previous two steps. However, the difference in the AD processing and the place to add TA makes some differences in proofs, mostly in the second step. 
The definition of OTRS is in Fig. 9 and its encryption is illustrated in Fig. 14. Here OTRS[τ ] consists of encryption function, OTRS-E τ , and decryption function, OTRS-D τ , and these functions use encryption and decryption cores, EF-S R and DF-S R , shown in Fig. 9 . These cores can be seen as counterparts to EF-S E and DF-S E . The AD processing is absorbed, hence there is no counterpart to AF-S E . The privacy and authenticity bounds of OTRS are shown in Theorem 6. The proof of Theorem 6 is in Section C. 5 . Moreover, for any AUTH-adversary A using q encryption queries and q v decryption queries,
Second step: analysis of TBC. In Fig. 10 we define a TBC, G ′ [P] ⟨A,N,i,ω⟩ (X), where (A, N, i, ω) ∈ T denotes a tweak and X denotes an input. It uses an n-bit URP, P. For tweaks that do not appear in Fig. 10 , we let them as undefined. Let R be a tweakable URF compatible with G ′ [P] . Then, in the same manner to Proposition 1 we have the following proposition.
We remark that G ′ [P] here does not perform GF doublings in a sequential manner, and performs AF-S P for every input, however, this does not cause a problem for simulation purpose. We then prove that G ′ [P] is a secure tweakable URF, shown by the following lemma. The proof is in Section C. 4 .
Lemma 3.
For adversary A accessing G ′ [P] usingueries, we write the j-th query of A as (X j , A j , N j , i j , ω j ) and let σ be the total blocks of unique ADs, defined as ∑ j=j [1] ,. ..,j[J] |A j | n , where A j[h] is the first representative element in the h-th equivalent class (i.e. A j[h] ̸ = A k for all k < j[h]), and J denotes the number of all equivalent
Switch ω 3.
Case a1 : ∆ ← 2 i−1 3 3 L 6.
Case a2 : ∆ ← 2 i−1 3 1 7L 7.
Case b1 : ∆ ← 2 i−1 3 2 L 8.
Case b2 : ∆ ← 2 i−1 7L 9. return ∆ Fig. 10 . Tweakable permutation implicitly used by OTRS [P, τ ] . AF-S is described in Fig. 7 . 
≤ Adv cpa
where the second inequality follows from Theorem 6, and the third follows from Lemma 3. This concludes the proof.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 3
We first consider G ′ [R], a function obtained by substituting P in Fig. 10 with an n-bit URF, R. Then we decompose G ′ [R] into a family of smaller functions written as Q = {Q i } i=1,. ..,10 4 . Let Rnd ∈ {0, 1} n be an 14 .
if x > 2 then 15. if independent and uniform variable, then we define
where U = R(0 n ). All functions have n-bit input and output, except Q 1 and Q 10 . Here Q 1 has input domain {0, 1} n \ {0 n }, and Q ( * , * ) 10 ( * ) has input domain (N × Ω) × {0, 1} n . Both have n-bit output. Function g( * , * , * ) is defined as Fig 10 and g(i, ω, x) is a multiplication over GF(2 n ) with x and a constant depending on (i, ω), written as c (i,ω) ∈ GF(2 n ). Therefore we may represent g(i, ω, x) by c (i,ω) · x. For example c (i,s) = 2(2 i−1 3) = 2 i 3. In the rest of the proof we assume i in g (i, ω, x) is no more than 2 n/2 , which is needed for security. From Proposition 5 of [44] we have Proposition 3. In Fig 10, for any 
is not an identity element nor zero element.
Using Q we build a function G[Q] which is equivalent to G ′ [R], shown by Fig. 11 . It uses CMAC ′ [Q], which is equivalent to the original CMAC [28] (instantiated by URF) except that the empty input produces 0 n output and the opposite GF coefficients for last-block mask, i.e. 2 (4) for the case the last input block is partial (full). Note that L in the algorithm of G[Q] contains Rnd from the output of Q 1 , but has no effect on the final output Y , as Rnd is canceled out by input mask of Q (i,ω) 10 thanks to the XOR-linearity of g. We may abbreviate Q (i,ω) 10 (x) as Q 10 (x) if underlying (i, ω) is obvious. We then show that Q is indistinguishable from a set of URFs.
for adversary A usingueries, where each query consists of tweak t and the corresponding input to Q t or Q t . Proof . Let ∆ t and ∇ t be the input and output masks for Q t , defined as
and
and other ∇ i s are 0 n , including ∇ (i,ω) 10 = 0 n for any (i, ω), where U = R(0 n ) and Rnd are independently random. 10 . We introduce Fig. 12 which defines two games, GameQ and Game Q. A query is (t, X, i, ω) and for any t ̸ = 10, i and ω are assumed to be fixed default values to avoid pointless queries. In Fig. 12 masks are written as functions taking all arguments, e.g. ∆ 2 (U, Rnd, i, ω) = ∆ 2 = Rnd and ∆ 10 (U, Rnd, i, ω) = ∆ (i,ω) 10 = g(i, ω, Rnd). We observe that GameQ and Game Q precisely simulate Q and Q. For Game Q this is obvious, since the output of Game Q is always independent and uniformly random. For GameQ the generation procedure of Y and YE in GameQ is opposite to that of Q; in GameQ, if XE is a new value, Y is uniformly sampled and then Y = YE ⊕ ∇ t is determined, while Q first determines YE randomly and computes Y = YE ⊕ ∇ t . However, both yield the identical marginal distribution of (Y, YE). If XE has a collision, GameQ determines YE from the set of previously sampled values, and Y is determined as Y ← YE ⊕ ∇ t . Games of Fig. 12 define the flag bad to set (in line 13) when two inputs to ρ after the input maskings collide. Then, following the Game-Playing technique [15] , both games are identical until bad gets set to true, thus we have
Hence what we need is to bound the last probability, which is derived from the pairwise collision probability of input masks. We see that max t∈{2,. . .,9},d∈{0,1} n Pr U,Rnd 
where the probabilities are defined by U and Rnd, which are independent and uniform over {0, 1} n (as U is a sole output of URF involved in the event). (44) and (45) denote the collision probability of the form 
return Y Fig. 12 . GameQ contains the boxed arguments, while Game Q does not.
We also define f A as CMAC ′ [ Q]. Then we have
due to the linearity of g. We then claim that a pair of functions, (f N X , f A ), is hard to distinguish from a pair of independent compatible URFs, respectively denoted by R N X and R A , where R A is a VIL-URF that can accept an empty string (unlike a normal URF) and produces 0 n . The proof is basically the same as the proof of OMAC [28] (more precisely the analysis of MOMAC function in [28] ), however direct application of [28] 's proof is not possible due to the existence of f N X which shares Q 1 with f A . Fig. 13 shows how (f N X , f A ) is queried. Throughout queries we assume that the oracle maintains the following lists. Let L 1 i,ω be the list of n-bit (non-tweak) input blocks to Q 10 in f N X , defined as g(i, ω, Q 1 (N ))⊕X. Similarly, let L 2 κ be the list of input blocks to Q κ in f A , for κ ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9}, which denotes the index set of finalization function. Let ε 1 be the event that a collision of two values in the same list L 1 i,ω , for some queried (i, ω), and let ε 2 be the event that a collision of two values in the same list L 2 κ , for some κ ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9}. Consider adversary A accessing pair (f N X , f A ), where a query specifies which function to access combined with an input to the specified function. Let q be the number of total queries and σ be the total input blocks to f A . We naturally assume there is no duplicate queries. We observe that the finalization functions, i.e. Q i to generate the output Y in Fig. 13 , used by f N X and f A are different. Therefore (f N X , f A ) can be seen as a pair of Carter-Wegman MACs using independent finalizations, or more generally a Carter-Wegman MAC combining f N X and f A with one-bit tweak for additional input to specify which one is used. This implies that 
Let X and X ′ be two distinct inputs with |X| n = m, |X ′ | n = m ′ , and h(X) = h(X ′ ) = κ. Without loss of generality we assume m ≥ m ′ . Then Pr[f −1 A (X i ) = f −1 A (X j )] is zero when κ = 5 or 6 (which implies m = m ′ = 1), and when κ = 8 or 9 (which implies m = m ′ = 2 with X[1] = X ′ [1] = 0 n , X[2] ̸ = X ′ [2]) since f −1 A output is X [2] . We then consider the remaining cases having κ = 3 or 4 (which include m, m ′ = 2 and X [1] , X ′ [1] ̸ = 0 n , 13 . fNX and fA, with finalization input lists. and the cases with at least one of m, m ′ is more than 2). Let CBC F be the standard CBC-MAC function using n-bit function F as the internal blockcipher, working for any input in ({0, 1} n ) i for i = 1, 2, . . . . We now introduce the following lemma of Black and Rogaway [19] .
Lemma 5. ( [19] ) For n-bit URF R and two distinct inputs to CBC R , X and X ′ , |X| = mn and |X ′ | = m ′ n, we have
Note that the lemma also implies Pr[CBC R (X) = c] ≤ 2(m + 1)/2 n for any c ∈ {0, 1} n (by applying CBC for both X∥0 n and c), and Pr[CBC R (X) ⊕ CBC R (X ′ ) = c] ≤ (m + 1) · (m ′ + 1)/2 n + max{m + 1, m ′ + 1}/2 n for any c ∈ {0, 1} n (by applying CBC for both X∥c and X ′ ∥0 n ). The remaining cases with κ = 3 or 4 can be further divided into the following sub-cases. Recall that we assumed h(X) = h(X ′ ), thus both X and X ′ have either partial last blocks or full last blocks. 
where V = Q 1 (X [1] ) ⊕ X [2] and V ′ = Q 1 (X ′ [1] ) ⊕ X ′ [2] , and the inequality follows from Lemma 5.
Case 3: m = 3, m ′ = 2, X[1] = 0 n , X ′ [1] ̸ = 0 n . Then f −1 A (X) = Q 7 (X[2]) ⊕ X [3] and f −1 A (X ′ ) = Q 1 (X ′ [1] ) ⊕ X ′ [2] , hence the probability is 1/2 n .
Case 4: m > 3, m ′ = 2, X[1] = 0 n , X ′ [1] ̸ = 0 n . The same analysis as Case 2 holds, with V = Q 7 (X [2] ) ⊕ X [3] . The probability is bounded by 2(m − 1)/2 n . Case 5: m > 2, m ′ > 2, X [1] , X ′ [1] ̸ = 0 n . Let V = Q 1 (X [1] ) ⊕ X [2] and V ′ = Q 1 (X ′ [1] ) ⊕ X ′ [2] . When (X [1] , X [2] ) ̸ = (X ′ [1] , X ′ [2] ), the probability of V = V ′ is at most 1/2 n , and given V ̸ = V ′ we have two distinct inputs to CBC Q 2 . Thus the conditional collision probability is
from Lemma 5 and the assumption m ≥ m ′ . Therefore, by adding the V -collision probability, the bound is obtained as (m − 1)(m ′ − 1)/2 n + (m ′ − 1)/2 n + 1/2 n , which is at most mm ′ /2 n + m/2 n . When (X [1] , X[2]) = (X ′ [1] , X ′ [2]), we have V = V ′ and two distinct inputs to CBC Q 2 , hence the same bound applies. Case 6: m > 2, m ′ > 2, X[1] = 0 n , X ′ [1] ̸ = 0 n or X[1] ̸ = 0 n , X ′ [1] = 0 n . The same as Case 5, and the bound is mm ′ /2 n + m ′ /2 n .
Therefore, summarizing all cases we have 
where the last inequality follows from [19] .
The analysis of Pr[ε 1 ] is easy. For any two (N, X, i, ω) ̸ = (N ′ , X ′ , i ′ , ω ′ ) with (i, ω) = (i ′ , ω ′ ), the probability of collision (i.e. g(i, ω, Q 1 (N )) ⊕ X = g(i ′ , ω ′ , Q 1 (N ′ )) ⊕ X ′ ) is at most 1/2 n , hence
Combining (58) 
Recall that we assumed R A (ε) = 0 n as f A . Hence g(i, ω, R A (ε))) = 0 n holds. Then we focus the collision probability at inputs to R N X . It is simple to observe that Pr[(N, i, ω, X ⊕ g(i, ω, R A (A))) = (N ′ , i ′ , ω ′ , X ′ ⊕ g(i ′ , ω ′ , R A (A ′ )))] ≤ 1 2 n (62) for any two distinct (A, N, i, ω, X) and (A ′ , N ′ , i ′ , ω ′ , X ′ ), including the cases A and/or A ′ is empty. This is because we require (N, i, ω) = (N ′ , i ′ , ω ′ ) to have non-zero probability for the left hand side of (62) and if A ̸ = A ′ the sum X ⊕ g(i, ω, R A (A)) ⊕ X ′ ⊕ g(i ′ , ω ′ , R A (A ′ )), which equals to c (i,ω) · (R A (A) ⊕ R A (A ′ )) ⊕ X ⊕ X ′ , is uniform. When A = A ′ and X ̸ = X ′ the collision probability is apparently zero. This implies that
for any adversary withueries, irrespective of lengths of A. 
